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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC-00606-88

7 April 1988

Senior Review Panel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
IIM: The Military Balance Between
Greece and Turkey: How It Stands--
Where It's Headed--What It Means,
internally dated 25 March 1988

1. The Panel finds the current draft IIM a considerable improvement over the earlier version. The Key Judgments are generally crisp and well reasoned. The paper's limited focus obviously prevents analysis of much more than tactical considerations--limited generally to the Aegean, Thrace, and Cyprus--though the broader strategic implications for NATO's southeast flank, basing rights, and US interests are fleetingly alluded to toward the end. The presentation leads to a conclusion that Greece and Turkey can hardly become our common allies in a NATO engagement in southeast Europe. We assume this is intended. *coord*

2. This version can still benefit from extensive cutting and editing out of repetition, especially the long story of weapons acquisitions and types. Much of this could be accomplished by a few graphics and a map--listing the forces of the two countries, their deployments, and their probable development for whatever is the time frame of the draft--all of which would make more intelligible the text's treatment of present and future force disparities. *yes.*

3. We note the draft's conclusion that Turkey generally outspends Greece in the military area (page 26). The most recent statistics in the paper do not appear to support the point. Greece spends annually an average of 6.6% of its GDP (\$38.8 billion in 1986) while Turkey averages 4.6% of its GDP (\$53 *check*


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billion in 1986) or \$2.560 billion for Greece and \$2.438 billion for Turkey (pages 24-26). Do NATO infrastructure expenditures account for this difference? Are they included for both Greece and Turkey?

4. Finally, we believe that the broader range of Turkey's defense interests on its eastern (USSR) and southern borders (Syria) and its minority concerns (Kurds) should be brought out more clearly. There is an asymmetry in respective force missions which does not emerge in a concentration on the Aegean and Thrace. no


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